Jiming Wang

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Ph.D. Candidate in Economics
The Pennsylvania State University

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Welcome! I am a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at the Pennsylvania State University, and I am on the 2026–2027 economics job market.

My research is in empirical industrial organization, with applications to environmental economics. I use structural models to study investment in electric vehicle charging infrastructure and its downstream effects on EV adoption and visits to nearby businesses. A separate line of work studies the design of public procurement.

Before Penn State, I received a B.S. in Mathematics and Physics from Tsinghua University, a B.A. and an M.A. in Economics from Peking University.

Fields of Interest

Working Papers

Spatial Heterogeneity of Externalities in EV Charging Investments
Job Market Paper, with Jianwei Xing
[Paper] [Abstract]

Private investment in EV charging infrastructure can be spatially misallocated when externalities and costs vary within cities. Using data on public charging stations, EV sales, and real-time station utilization in China, we estimate a dynamic investment game between charging service providers. We distinguish high-density urban cores from low-density peripheries and quantify two opposing externalities. The indirect network effect of charging capacity on EV purchases is roughly twice as large in the core as in the periphery, leading to underinvestment in the core. By contrast, the business stealing effect between providers is about four times as large in the periphery, inducing overinvestment there. Using the estimated model, we find that private investment is about 22% below the social optimum in the core and 9% above it in the periphery. These distortions generate an annual welfare loss of about 3.87 million RMB for a representative city. Maximizing city surplus requires subsidizing new capacity in the core and taxing it in the periphery. Our results imply that accounting for spatial heterogeneity is essential for effective policy design.

Heterogeneity of Indirect Network Effects: Empirical Analysis of the Chinese Electric Vehicle Market
with Jianwei Xing, Junji Xiao, and Xiaodan Guo
Revise and Resubmit, Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists
[Paper] [Abstract]

Governments can accelerate technology adoption by directly subsidizing the technology or supporting complementary infrastructure, particularly when indirect network effects are present. This paper examines the heterogeneity of these indirect network effects, driven by variations in product characteristics within the market. Using data on electric vehicle (EV) sales and charging infrastructure provision in China, and focusing on a period of rapid market expansion with increasing product differentiation, we analyze the indirect network effects between EV adoption and charging stations, investigating their heterogeneity. We also assess the relative effectiveness of EV purchase subsidies and charger subsidies in promoting EV adoption. Our findings reveal that the strength of indirect network effects depends on vehicle characteristics, particularly driving range. Furthermore, the two subsidy instruments have distinct distributional effects: purchase subsidies primarily benefit high-range vehicles and their buyers, while charger subsidies disproportionately favor low-range vehicles and their buyers.

Growth or Redistribution? The Business Effects of EV Charging Infrastructure in Kansas City
with Ruohao Zhang, Xibo Wan, Zhen Lei, and Junxian Tang
Under Review
[Paper] [Abstract]

Public infrastructure such as EV charging stations (EVCS) can raise nearby business activity, but these gains may reflect redistribution rather than net growth. Using cellphone mobility data on restaurant visits in Kansas City, we estimate a random-coefficient logit model. To address endogenous EVCS placement, we develop novel spatial instruments using algorithmically simulated charging station locations based on citywide road geography and future deployment in peripheral rings. Our estimates show that consumers value a nearby EVCS at $5.23 per restaurant visit, equivalent to 11 extra minutes of one-way travel. While EVCS generate a significant gain in restaurant visits, about three-quarters of the gain reflects redistribution, suggesting that evaluations based on local business gains can overstate the economic benefits of infrastructure investment. Redistribution also matters for place-based policy. Counterfactual simulations show that targeting EVCS to disadvantaged tracts within the city makes restaurant visits more unevenly distributed in those communities.

Work in Progress

Rule-Bound Buyers Seek Discretion Most? Procurement Discretion, Thresholds, and Supplier Selection in China
with Songrui Liu, Guangrong Ma, and Yaohong Zhao
[Abstract]

Governments routinely cap discretion in public procurement by requiring open bidding above a monetary threshold. The cap is easy to evade: buyers who want flexibility can simply shrink the contract. Using more than six million Chinese government procurement records from 2013 to 2023, we document sharp bunching just below the threshold, with reported values reduced by roughly 2 to 3 percent of the cutoff. Central-government buyers bunch the most aggressively, even though they are widely viewed as the most rule-bound. To unpack this, we build a parametric selection model in which buyers weigh the cost of compressing contract value against the benefits of discretion. The model separates two motives behind the demand for discretion. Under a public motive, buyers protect contracts that channel spending toward nearby suppliers and support the local economy. Under a private motive, buyers protect contracts that generate rents for themselves. Our estimates indicate that the public motive dominates on average. Buyers who bear less of the cost of shrinking contracts bunch more, which is why central procurement bunches the most: with no local fiscal stake to protect and tighter oversight curbing private rents, both motives for guarding contract value are muted. On the supplier side, discretion shortens procurement timelines and routes contracts toward older, larger, and more often state-owned firms, but these gains do not extend to broader policy goals such as innovation, support for smaller firms, or lower resource use.